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With the highest per capita carbon emissions among the G20, Canada presents 
the interesting case of a climate laggard and, in some respects, a first-world petro-state. 
In these circumstances, a regime of obstruction, with a distinctive political-economic 
architecture, has taken shape. This regime is constituted through modalities of power 
that protect revenue streams issuing from carbon extraction, processing and transport 
while bolstering popular support for an accumulation strategy in which fossil capital 
figures as a leading fraction.   It incorporates a panoply of hegemonic practices at 
different scales, reaching into civil and political society, and into Indigenous 
communities whose land claims and worldviews challenge state mandated property 
rights. This article first highlights findings from a six-year collaborative investigation of 
the modalities through which fossil capital’s economic and political-cultural power is 
exercised at different scales, then outlines how the passive-revolutionary project of 
‘climate capitalism’ is taking shape in the Canadian context as a response to climate 
crisis, and finally considers how a project of energy democracy, might hold the potential 





As the 21st Century’s second decade draws to a close, the increasingly severe symptoms of 
climate change comprise a pivot and perhaps a turning point in the struggle for hegemony, globally 
and within national formations. ‘This Changes Everything,’ wrote Naomi Klein (2014) in 
presenting capitalism as the incontrovertible enemy of the climate. Yet as Klein herself recognized, 
the ascent of transnational neoliberalism has complicated prospects for moving beyond market-
driven extractivism and endless growth. Indeed, Wainwright and Mann (2018) hold that the most 
likely future scenario is that of Climate Leviathan, a more authoritarian capitalism governed by 
strong states that manage the climate through technologies and market mechanisms that reinforce 
 
1 This paper is part of the Corporate Mapping Project (CMP), a research and public engagement initiative investigating 
the power of the fossil fuel industry. The CMP is jointly led by the University of Victoria, Canadian Centre for Policy 
Alternatives and the Parkland Institute. This research was supported by the Social Science and Humanities Research 
Council of Canada (SSHRC).  An earlier version of this article was presented as an invited address to 'Antonio Gramsci: 
a legacy for the future,' Simon Fraser University, October 21, 2018. 
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capitalist class power and North-South inequities. Fossil capitalism’s organic crisis is twofold, both 
civilizational and ecological, and global in scale. Yet despite the emergence of a transnational 
capitalist class and of global governance institutions attuned to crisis management, national 
formations, and the economic, political and cultural forces centred within them, continue to hold 
considerable sway (Carroll 2018). Within each national theater of contention, capital and its allies 
strive to maintain a competitive economy, and to win the continuing loyalty of broad swathes of 
the general public and strategically targeted subaltern groups.  
With the highest per capital carbon emissions among the G20 states (Rabson 2018), Canada 
presents the interesting case of a climate laggard and, in some respects, a first-world petro-state 
(Nikiforuk 2010). Canada holds the world’s third largest reserves of oil, but 97.4% of these are ‘low-
quality oil sands that are energy- and emissions-intensive to extract and costly to refine’ (Hughes 
2018: 164). Although jobs directly in the fossil-capital sector account for a tiny fraction of the 
national workforce, and although state revenues from that sector have plunged in recent years to 
negligible levels (ibid), political and corporate leadership is solidly behind a slightly modified 
‘business-as-usual’, with carbon extraction continuing to increase (even as other measures partly 
mitigate ever-growing emissions). Thirteen years after Prime Minister Stephen Harper declared 
Canada an ‘energy superpower’, a bloated oil and gas sector centred upon the tar sands is integral 
to ‘the decisive nucleus of economic activity' (Gramsci 1971: 161) that hegemony protects.   
In these circumstances, a regime of obstruction, with a distinctive political-economic 
architecture, has taken shape.  Building on hegemonic relations installed during successive eras of 
organized capitalism and neoliberal capitalism, this regime is constituted through modalities of 
power that protect revenue streams issuing from carbon extraction, processing and transport while 
bolstering popular support for an accumulation strategy in which fossil capital figures as a leading 
fraction. The regime incorporates a panoply of hegemonic practices at different scales, reaching 
into civil and political society, and into Indigenous communities whose land claims and 
worldviews challenge state mandated property rights.  
Yet the visibly deepening climate crisis challenges fossil capitalism while the rise of ‘climate 
capitalism’ as an alternative accumulation strategy (Sapinski 2015, 2016) opens space for a passive 
revolution that would protect capital’s economic nucleus while (conceivably) avoiding 
catastrophic climate change. The organic crisis also opens space for an alternative from the left, 
namely ‘energy democracy’, which I conceptualize as a bundle of non-reformist reforms (Gorz 
1967) that may hold out the possibility of an anti-passive revolution pointing toward an eco-
socialist resolution of the crisis.  
This article draws upon findings from a six-year collaborative investigation, centred on the 
case of Canada. Our project combines social science inquiry with popular education and 
democratic advocacy, in an ongoing program of public sociology and action research (Carroll and 
Daub 2018).2  I first highlight some of our findings on the modalities through which fossil capital’s 
economic and political-cultural power is exercised at different scales, then outline how the passive-
 
2  For details on the Corporate Mapping Project go to https://www.corporatemapping.ca/. 
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revolutionary project of ‘climate capitalism’ is taking shape in the Canadian context as a response 
to climate crisis, and finally consider how a project of energy democracy, currently on the margins 
of civil and political society, might hold the potential to catalyze the formation of an alternative 
historical bloc, opening onto eco-socialism.   
 
Modalities of Corporate Power 
 
In mapping the carbon-extractive sector’s organization, its political-cultural reach and also 
popular resistance to its power, our project offers a relational analysis of hegemony, attuned to 
political-economic as well as discursive structures and practices. At the centre of the analysis is the 
idea that corporate power is wielded through a number of distinct modalities.  
A Gramscian perspective invites us to distinguish two dialectically constituted faces of 
contemporary corporate power – the economic and the political-cultural. Following Urry (1981), 
Figure 1 schematizes these as a distinctive architecture comprised of three overlapping fields: state, 
civil society and economy. Although these are differentiated, they are not separate. Gramsci 
observed that ‘the state intervenes at every moment of economic life, which is a continuous web of 
transfers of property’ (2007: 10). In his prison notebooks ‘there is a generative understanding of 
“civil society” not as a separate sphere in opposition to the “state” but as an element in dialectical 




Figure 1. Modalities of corporate power (from Carroll and Sapinski 2018:101)   
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Corporate power’s economic face is coterminous with the entire process of capital accumulation, 
from extraction, manufacturing and transport through marketing and finance. Economic power 
is inscribed in control of the labour process, in the wealth that capital appropriates, as profit, from 
labour and the rest of nature, and in the economic dependence of workers, communities and states 
on corporate investments, to generate jobs and revenue.   
There are several distinct modalities of economic power. Operational power is the power 
of management, flowing through a chain of command, in the appropriation of surplus labour. But 
it is also wielded along commodity chains, from resource extraction, through processes of 
transport, processing, to manufacturing and distribution. In Canada, bitumen represents four-fifth 
of extractable oil (Hughes 2018), and five large companies control most of the action, with two 
additional firms dominating the continental pipeline infrastructure (Hussey, Pineault, Jackson and 
Cake 2020). Strategic power, the power to set business strategies, involves control of the 
corporation itself, often by owning the largest bloc of shares. Our mapping of share ownership of 
leading Canada-based fossil-capital corporations reveals a confluence of Canadian capitalist 
ownership – via families and financial institutions – and foreign ownership via transnational 
corporations and asset managers. These ownership relations are arrayed in a network of many 
weak ties (smaller institutional holdings) and a few dozen large holdings that confer strategic 
control upon their corporate or personal owners. The concentration of fossil capital and of its 
ownership/control represents a massive centralization of economic power in the hands of private 
investors accountable only to themselves (Carroll and Huijzer 2018). Finally, allocative power 
stems from the control of credit, the money-capital on which large corporations depend. This 
power, which accrues to financial institutions of all sorts (banks, life insurers, asset managers, 
hedge funds etc.), is crucial in expanding or retooling operations, launching takeover bids or 
coping with cash squeezes during crises (Carroll and Sapinski 2018). Canada’s financial sector is 
dominated by five big banks, each of which enables the accumulation of fossil capital and 
appropriates a portion of the surplus, through loans and share ownership, sometimes accompanied 
by interlocking directorates (ibid). A recent study by the Rainforest Action Network identified all 
five of Canada’s big banks as international leaders in the funding of fossil capital.3 These economic 
modalities are integrated within a complex circuitry in which capital metamorphoses across the 
productive, commercial and financial forms initially identified by Marx (1967a). 
Figure 1 also depicts the hegemonic face of corporate power, as it extends into the political 
and cultural fields. Hegemonic power refers to how consent is secured, organized and maintained, 
from the visceral level of everyday life up to the top tiers of state and inter-governmental 
institutions. Within political and civil society corporate power is exercised by capital’s organic 
intellectuals: including corporate capitalists as ‘business leaders’. As Giuseppe Vacca (1982) has 
noted, such intellectuals are ‘organic’ in a double sense: they are ‘organizers’ of an advanced 
capitalist way of life, and their intellectual work is functionally (organically) predicated on the 
dominance of capital in human affairs. Most organic intellectuals are not capitalists but well-placed 
 
3  See https://www.ran.org/banking_on_climate_change  
4




and highly skilled professionals whose agency legitimates and facilitates the corporate system, 
through public relations and media, policy formation, lobbying, higher education, accounting and 
corporate law, etc. (Carroll and Shaw 2001).  
Such experts can also be found on the directorates of leading corporations, where they function in 
an advisory capacity, integrating the corporate elite by serving on multiple boards.  Indeed, a dense 
network of interlocking directorates among Canada’s leading fossil-capital companies pulls 
together capitalists and organic intellectuals, as a cohesive elite within the wider Canadian 
corporate community (and the even wider transnational capitalist class, Carroll 2010). Within this 
elite, power is centralized, as top capitalists and their advisors interact frequently, maintaining a 
sense of solidarity and common purpose even as they compete over the division of spoils 
appropriated from labour and nature.  The corporate community’s cohesiveness is an important 
modality of hegemony, as it enables corporate capital to reach a consensus on long-term goals and 
vision, and on that basis, to speak politically with a single voice, and lead. 
Network-analytic findings from our project make this clear.  The dense core of the fossil-
capital elite is centred in Calgary, host to most Canadian fossil-capital firms, many of which share 
directors, creating a highly integrated local network. The Calgary-based core, in turn, is part of a 
regionalized national network, as fossil companies share directors with financial institutions based 
mainly in Toronto, and with other major Canadian corporations.  The Canadian national network 
is embedded in a transnational elite network that includes major corporations based in Europe, 
Asia and the USA (Carroll 2017).  
Complementing elite integration is the reach of corporate power into the public sphere, 
shaping the institutions, agendas, policies, discourses and values that add up to an entire way of 
life. Corporate reach is a many-splendored thing.  Vis-à-vis civil society, it includes, among other 
hegemonic practices: 
 business leadership exercised by corporate elites as they govern business councils, industry 
groups, policy-planning organizations, and institutions of high education and research 
(Carroll, Graham, Lang, McCartney and Yunker 2018),  
 selective allocation of funds to business-friendly think tanks, advocacy groups, 
foundations, political parties etc.,  
 public-relations and corporate social responsibility initiatives,  
 the framing of news and other media content to privilege business interests (who as 
advertisers selectively fund that content; Hackett and Adams 2018), and  
 the corporate organization of communications media, whose goal of profit maximization 
trumps the public interest.  
Corporate funding of civil-society organizations is itself an expression of allocative power 
reaching into and colonizing the public sphere. Funds accumulated as capital are selectively 
directed, often through private foundations, to initiatives aligned with corporate business, 
including policy-planning groups, political parties, lobbies and industry groups, universities and 
research centres, community organizations and petro-turf advocacy groups such as Canada’s 
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Energy Citizens, which is a creature of the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) 
(Carroll, Graham, Lang, McCartney and Yunker 2018).  
Corporate power reaches into the state through a range of hegemonic practices. These 
include: 
●  intensive and sustained lobbying. According to Canada’s Federal Lobbying Registry, in 
2017 alone, CAPP logged 162 lobbying events with the federal government, averaging more 
than three meetings each week with top officials. 
●  regulatory capture. Canada’s National Energy Board (NEB) rubber-stamped industry 
proposals for years, leading an investigative panel to observe in 2017 that ‘Canadians have 
serious concerns that the NEB has been “captured” by the oil and gas industry, with many 
Board members who come from the industry that the NEB regulates, and who — at the 
very least appear to — have an innate bias toward that industry’ (McCarthy 2017; cf. Daub, 
Ejeckam, Graham and Yunker 2020).   
●  revolving doors, through which capital’s business leaders and organic intellectuals become 
political leaders and vice versa.4  
A final aspect of corporate reach into political society aligns corporations with the 
repressive arm of the state, as co-managers of dissent and surveillance. When hegemony fails — 
when dissent becomes well organized and potentially effective — the state turns to more repressive 
means of social control. Vis-à-vis fossil capital, this began to happen under the Harper regime 
(2006-2015), as coalitions of Indigenous, environmental and social-justice activists rose up in 
opposition to proposed pipelines such as Northern Gateway and Keystone XL. The state response 
was to mobilize its security agencies in partnership with top fossil-fuel corporations, to protect 
‘strategic infrastructure’ (Crosby and Monaghan 2018). Although the Trudeau government 
softened the legal language in 2017, it continues to target ‘interference with critical infrastructure’ 
as a threat to national security and to allow authorities to detain protestors by ‘preventative arrest’, 
within a framework of ‘partnership’ between state and corporate owners (Rowley 2017).  This last 
power modality reminds us that although hegemony is ethico-political, its persuasive efforts are 
armored with coercion. 
 
4  For instance, Preston Manning, son of Ernest Manning, the right-wing populist premier of Alberta from 1943 to 
1968, served as management consultant to fossil capital and CEO of a mid-sized property-development company 
before founding the Alberta-centred Reform Party in 1987 (appointing Stephen Harper as Policy Chief). Both 
Manning and Harper were elected to parliament in 1993, and Manning became Opposition Leader in 1997. After his 
retirement from politics in 2002, he founded the Manning Centre for Building Democracy, a vehicle for the 
‘Gramscian right’ (George 1997) whose project is ‘to support Canada's conservative movement by networking best 
practices & ideas pertaining to individual responsibility and a more robust civil society.’ See 
https://www.manningcentre.ca.  The Reform Party’s successor, the Canadian Alliance Party, effectively took over 
Canada’s Progressive Conservative Party in 2004, under Harper’s leadership. For his part, after serving as Canada’s 
Prime Minister (2006-2015), Harper founded a consultancy, Harper & Associates, joined the advisory board of 
Azimuth Capital Management, and in February 2018 was elected President of the International Democratic Union, 
an umbrella organization for right-wing parties that include Hungary’s Fidesz, India’s BJP, Israel’s Likud and the US’s 
Republicans – all currently in power. See https://www.idu.org/.  
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These various modalities can be placed within a wider framework that recognizes that 
power implies resistance (Barbalet 1985). Resistance to (fossil) capital takes many forms, e.g.:  
 shop-floor struggles of workers against the lash of management,  
 protests, boycotts and blockades at key junctures along commodity chains,  
 movements challenging corporate power on the basis of climate justice and Indigenous 
claims, 
 shareholder activism and divestment campaigns, engaging the power of investors,  
 calls for the private allocative power of finance to be brought under public control,  
 critiques of the concentration of power within old boys’ clubs and corporate elites,  
 demands to remove big money from politics and to end the institutional corruption that 
infects practices of business lobbying,  
 court challenges to capitalist projects, brought by environmental and Indigenous 
organizations, 
 media activism pushing to democratize public communication while fostering 
community-based media,  
 counter-hegemonic projects to transform our way of life – as in the 2015 Leap Manifesto, 
which proposed to shift from fossil capitalism to energy democracy.5   
Although this article focuses on the regime of obstruction, issues of resistance (and even 
transformation) are never far below the surface, and in the final section I will explore the prospects 
for energy democracy as an alternative to fossil capitalism.  
  
Accumulation strategies, hegemonic projects, historical blocs 
 
In a Gramscian perspective, power grounded in practices of capital accumulation and 
power resident in political and cultural practices are dialectically related. To the extent that they 
cohere into a way of life, whether regnant or aspirational, they form the institutional and 
ideological foundations of an historical bloc.  For Gramsci,  
 
…the historical bloc reflects 'the necessary reciprocity between structure and 
superstructure' ([Gramsci] 1971: 366). This reciprocity is realized through specific 
intellectual, moral and political practices. These translate narrow sectoral, 
professional, or local (in his terms, 'economic-corporate') interests into broader 
'ethico-political' ones. Thus the ethico-political not only helps to co-constitute 
economic structures but also provides them with their rationale and legitimacy 
(Sum and Jessop 2013: 199).  
 
  Inspired by French Regulation Theory (Aglietta 1979), Jessop (1983) has helped specify the 
core components of historical blocs through the couplet, ‘accumulation strategies’ and ‘hegemonic 
 
5  http://leapmanifesto.org/en/the-leap-manifesto/. 
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project’. Across the Global North during the post-war boom era, the reciprocally-reinforcing 
complex of fordist consumer capitalism (accumulation strategy) and Keynesian Welfare State 
(hegemonic project) came to comprise an expansive historical bloc that included organized labour. 
This bloc began to unravel in the stagflation of the 1970s.   It gave way to a more transnationalized 
neoliberal paradigm, catalyzed by Thatcherism and Reaganism. Financial capital came to play the 
leading role, in an accumulation strategy of ‘supply-side’, trickle-down economics and in the 
‘market-driven politics’ (Leys 2001) of a deregulatory regime offering jobs and lower taxes as 
material concessions to the atomized worker-consumer, on the condition that obstacles to 
investment (including no-longer-affordable state programs) be removed (Carroll 2003).  
Under neoliberalism a different historical bloc was assembled in the Global North, 
favouring financial capital and the asset-owning middle class (Van der Pijl and Yurchenko 2014), 
expelling organized labour, and with it, the politics of class compromise. Neoliberalism stoked 
accumulation, but it narrowed the hegemonic bloc, shrinking the middle class, intensifying class 
inequities, and ultimately creating a bubble of over-accumulated fictitious capital (Durand 2017), 
which burst in the autumn of 2008. Yet with the failure of any alternative to neoliberal capitalism 
to gain popular traction, neoliberalism has limped along while right-wing populism gains ground, 
with authoritarian and neo-fascist leadership now installed in Hungary, the Philippines, Brazil, the 
US and elsewhere – a development that ultimately raises challenges for transnational 
neoliberalism’s commitment to open borders and the rule of law. 
This narrative of shifting accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects can be enhanced 
by bringing political ecology into the picture. Four historical periods can be distinguished:  
1. Fossil capital has been at the core of capital accumulation since the early-to-mid decades 
of the 19th C, and capitalism could not have become globally dominant without resort, at 
mass-production scale, to the power of buried sunshine (Malm 2016). 
2. In the close integration of financial and industrial capital that marked the formation of 
corporate capitalism, fossil capital held a central place, as it did in the ‘carbon democracy’ 
(Mitchell 2011) through which the western working class gained concessions as the Middle 
East was colonized for its oil.  
3. Post-war consumer capitalism brought suburbanization and automobility, as fossil-fueled 
articles of consumption reshaped the lifeworlds of Northern worker-consumers while 
carbon pollution accelerated.  This combination of accumulation and hegemony set the 
table for neoliberalism by fostering entrepreneurial subjects interested mainly in their own 
retained earnings (Huber 2013). Neoliberal globalization since the 1980s has intensified 
both the penetration of fossil capital into lifeworlds, worldwide, and the volume of carbon 
emitted. 
4. In our current era, fossil-fueled consumer capitalism continues to be paradigmatic yet, 
spurred by the deepening climate crisis, alternatives have been taking shape, portending 
change in the hegemonic historical bloc.   
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Fossil capital within the hegemonic bloc 
 
Gramscian thinking foregrounds how consent is organized on many scales – from 
households and families up to ‘the historic blocs underpinning particular states [which] become 
connected through the mutual interests and ideological perspectives of social classes in different 
countries – portending ‘an incipient world society’ (Cox 1987:7). In this perspective, globalization 
is seen not as an abstract process but as ‘the complex and emergent product of various practices 
and processes operating on many scales’ (Jessop, 2002:113). Drawing on research from our 
collaborative project and related endeavors, we can unpack how the hegemony of fossil capital 
works within a multi-scalar regime of obstruction, extending from the everyday to the global. Table 
1 offers some key instances (discussed below), but should not be seen as anything like a complete 
inventory. 
 
Table 1: The regime of obstruction at different scales 
 
Scale Key instances 
Everyday life Fossil-fueled consumer capitalism as a way of life: the 
privatized geography of automobility and suburbanization 
Local community Civic privatism/boosterism and hegemonic community 
economic identity: “The oil industry is us”; Indigenous 
ambivalence 
Institutions Entrenchment of fossil interests in institutions of knowledge 
production, etc.: petro-universities and state-subsidized R&D 
Sub-national Alberta as petro-state, fossil boosterism in extractive and 
sacrifice zones 
National Contention around the ‘national interest’, through elite policy-
planning and online extractivist populist networks 
Transnational Global governance and transnational policy-planning to 
manage crisis and maintain fossil-capital predominance 
 
In everyday life, Matthew Huber (2013) has explored how the hegemony of fossil capital was 
cemented in post-war America, with the rise of suburbanized consumerism.  Within this 
assemblage, the individual experiences automobility as empowering and liberating, and the single 
detached house as a domain of personal sovereignty.  The long-range result, in social formations 
organized around suburbanized consumer capitalism, has been to constrain politics within narrow 
limits ‘focused on the family, private property, and anticollectivist sentiments’ (Huber 2013, 79) – 
the stock-and-trade of neoliberalism. Deeply ingrained in everyday pleasures and conveniences is 
the hegemony of fossil capital.  
9
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Emily Eaton and Simon Enoch’s (2020) ethnographic research shows how fossil 
corporations have instilled a ‘hegemonic community economic identity’ in small-town 
Saskatchewan as citizens embrace the frames and narratives of the petroleum industry. In these 
instances, a fossil-capitalist world view is deeply lodged in identity and community, as the 
allocative power of corporations to fund local amenities combines with the discursive power of 
industry-propagated frames. Communities come to see their fate and industry’s fate as inextricably 
linked and they rise to the defense of companies against threats posed by climate-activist 
‘outsiders’.   
In Canada, some local communities are Indigenous, and their strong claims to land and 
self-governance have always troubled a hegemonic bloc based in settler colonialism. Genocidal 
policies succeeded for many decades in marginalizing and silencing Indigenous voices, but have 
bequeathed a legacy of injustice that in our era demands reparation. Resurgent Indigenous politics 
speaks in an ethico-political voice, defending Mother Earth and championing buen vivir with an 
appealing alternative vision. Yet as Clifford Atleo (2020) argues, Indigenous struggles for self-
determination coexist, ambivalently, with capitalism’s powerful capacities to invade ‘every corner 
of the earth and our imaginations.’ Settler capitalism was founded on accumulation by 
dispossession (Coulthard 2014), and as Indigenous peoples’ land was stolen many lost their 
livelihoods and migrated to cities, where land-based sensibilities may weaken. This has led some, 
including some Indigenous leaders, to internalize the logic of neoliberal capitalism within a 
contradictory consciousness between the aspiration for Indigenous resurgence and the lure of 
securing a portion of the wealth that capital and state are intent on continuing to extract from 
Indigenous lands. Within advanced settler colonialism, one version of self-determination now 
envisages Indigenous peoples as sovereign participants in a capitalist way of life, garnering the 
benefits of resource extraction within ‘a despiritualized world understood simply as a business 
opportunity’ (Coburn and Atleo 2016: 190). This accumulation strategy is favoured by the 
Canadian state and capitalist class, as a means of winning effectively permanent consent to 
capitalist development on Indigenous land. The struggle for hearts and minds is no less salient for 
Indigenous peoples than for non-Indigenous. 
At subnational scale, we encounter a diversity of scenarios, shaped by the uneven spatial 
distribution of carbon resources. In extractive and sacrifice zones, fossil boosterism tends to 
prevail, with good-news narratives displacing dissent and critique. As Laurie Adkin (2016) holds, 
Alberta in particular functions largely as a petro-state. At first blush, British Columbia, 
immediately to the west of Alberta and currently governed by a social-democratic/green alliance 
that opposes the expansion of a bitumen pipeline from Alberta to Vancouver, might appear as just 
the opposite. Yet the ongoing capitalization of massive reserves of methane in BC’s northeast 
suggests otherwise, as does the ‘captured’ status of the BC Oil and Gas Commission, which rubber-
stamps new fossil-capital projects (Daub, Ejeckam, Graham and Yunker, 2020).  In Alberta, where 
fossil capital reigns supreme, the same regulatory capture is evident, but hegemonic reach extends 
to an industrial-scientific complex which subsidizes corporate profitability by lowering production 
10




costs as it also transfuses market values into the public sphere (Carroll, Graham and Yunker 2018).  
Fossil capital’s reach into this domain exemplifies hegemonic practices within specific institutions.  
In ‘Petro-universities and the production of knowledge for the post-carbon future’ Laurie Adkin 
(2020) documents how fossil-capital interests have become entrenched, both within state 
innovation agencies that fund university-based research and within Alberta’s universities 
themselves.  
At national scale, the struggle for hearts and minds is condensed into contention around 
the ‘national interest’.  Here we can discern a shift from the hard-denialism of Harper to a Trudeau 
regime that acknowledges fossil capital’s central role in the climate crisis while denying the need 
to decarbonize energy systems at a pace commensurate with what we know from climate science. 
As a hegemonic intervention, this ‘new denialism’ (Daub, Blue, Rajewicz and Yunker 2020) 
advocates technological and market-based fixes that buy time for continuing to ramp-up carbon 
extraction while creating new profit-making opportunities, both for fossil capital and for a 
subordinate but growing renewables sector. The strategic gambit is to win a measure of popular 
support while neutralizing opposition. The Trudeau government’s 2016 announcement of a Pan-
Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change, nine days after approving two major 
pipeline projects (one of which the federal government now owns), is exemplary (Linnitt 2016).  
This seemingly incoherent construction of the national interest continues a long tradition of 
brokerage politics for which the Liberal Party of Canada has been the leading agent.  The ‘national 
interest’ in ‘clean growth’ addresses the interests of Alberta-centred fossil capital and eastern-based 
finance and manufacturing while promising jobs to workers and a healthy environment.  But with 
TMX now stalled and a right-wing populist government in Ontario, the Framework has been 
unraveling. The challenges facing the Framework illustrate how entrenched fossil capital interests 
are within the federated Canadian polity, and how low-tax, light-regulation neoliberalism deepens 
those trenches. 
Of course, the practices that maintain a wider historical bloc for fossil capitalism extend 
beyond the state-capital nexus (Apeldoorn, De Graaff and Overbeek 2017), in both elite and 
popular registers.  Board interlocks enable carbon-sector reach into knowledge-producing 
domains of civil society, in an elite network that is centred in Alberta yet linked to the central-
Canadian corporate elite through hegemonic capitalist organizations that include business 
councils, think tanks and industry associations. The many threads of communication and 
collaboration in civil society afforded by interlocking governance boards enable the fossil-capital 
elite to advance its profit-driven concerns as in the national interest, ‘obstructing the kinds of 
changes that could decarbonize our ecological footprint in a timely manner, but that also threaten 
corporate profits and control of economic decisions’ (Carroll, Graham, Lang, McCartney and 
Yunker 2018: 446).  
Elite networks are complemented by what Gunster et al. (2020) term emergent online 
networks of extractivist populism in combination constituting a petrobloc ‘oriented around 
neoliberal extractivism, ecoskepticism and transnational “market fundamentalist” epistemic 
communities’ (Neubauer 2017: iii).  The populist wing portrays ‘ordinary people’ as victims of 
11
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liberal elites who impose their values upon everyone else (Gunster and Saurette 2014). Rapid 
growth of extractivist groups on social media, sometimes directly sponsored by fossil capital, marks 
a strategic shift from traditional advertising towards targeted mobilization to convert passive 
stakeholders into engaged issue publics.  In constructing a pro-fossil ‘national interest’ based partly 
in anti-elite resentment, these groups combine conventional pro-business tropes (e.g., jobs vs 
environment, opposition to state regulation) with more innovative discourses to construct 
accessible, appealing and easily shared legitimating narratives and frames. Online extractivist 
communities become ‘echo chambers’ that insulate industry supporters from the wider world, 
accentuating the public sphere’s fragmentation and impeding public conversations crucial to 
democracy (Ferguson 2018).  
Elite networks have also been important in maintaining an historical bloc at transnational 
scale. Space does not allow in-depth discussion of this complex issue.  My own research (Carroll 
2019) shows that the segment of the global corporate elite network centred upon fossil capital is 
divided between a large, integrated community of mainly American corporations, a smaller 
Franco-German-Canadian configuration and a third, loosely-knit, diverse community in which 
British capital predominates. Fossil capital continues to occupy a central position in the American 
corporate community, as it does in Canada. The mapping also reveals a weaker presence of fossil 
capital on the European continent, an incipient alignment of European and Chinese capital (both 
financial and industrial), and the continuing marginality in the global corporate elite of Southern-




Still, changes are afoot, with China and Europe (and sub-nationally, states such as 
California) opening space for renewables in the energy mix while major financial institutions 
divest from the dirtiest fossil fuels, including Alberta’s Tar Sands (McSheffrey 2017).6  This brings 
us to climate capitalism, an emergent accumulation strategy which ‘seeks to redirect investments 
from fossil energy to renewable energy generation so as to foster an ecological modernization of 
production and reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions’ (Sapinski 2015: 268; Adkin 2017). The 
promise of climate capitalism is to shepherd the world to a safe landing without disrupting its 
essential nucleus in capitalist relations of production.  
Intergovernmentally, the path to Climate Capitalism begins with the 1997 Kyoto accord, 
and runs, two decades on, through Paris. It is a rocky road. The world’s putative hegemon never 
signed on to Kyoto and more recently announced its withdrawal from Paris. Yet Climate 
Capitalism has also gained traction, for example, among institutional investors. In 2018 Larry Fink, 
CEO of Blackrock, the world’s leading asset manager, issued an open letter to fellow CEOs which 
 
6 BankTrack’s ongoing compilation lists 16 major financial institutions that have ended financing for Tar Sands 
operations. See https://www.banktrack.org/campaign/banks_that_ended_direct_finance_for_tar_sands, accessed 23 
July 2019.  
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struck a strong blow for proactive management of environmental impact.7 As Marx (1967b) 
observed, financial institutions are the ‘general managers’ of the total social capital. Such 
admonitions signal an awareness among those general managers of the threat climate change 
poses. Yet actions speak louder than words. According to an NGO-sponsored online campaign, 
Blackrock has ‘a big problem’: ‘as the world's biggest investor, Blackrock is also the world's biggest 
owner of fossil fuel companies.’8  
Climate Capitalism is a strategy still under construction, promoted within elite networks 
that bring corporate leaders together with policy communities and other organic intellectuals. As 
Sapinski has shown, environmental policy groups interlock extensively with the world’s largest 
corporations, constituting a ‘climate capitalist corporate-policy elite’ small in size but positioned 
at the heart of the global network (2015:273), with European firms most involved (Sapinksi 2016: 
97). However, the presence of major fossil-capital companies at the heart of the network suggests 
‘a weak project of climate capitalism’ (Sapinski 2015:276) – a slow transition to ecologically 
modernized production, averting stranded assets while allowing fossil capital to expand control of 
replacement energy sources (Sapinski 2016: 106). Indeed, as Tadzio Müller (2013) notes, in the 
German context, ‘the short-term goal of the energy companies and their government allies is to 
delay the transition just long enough so that the companies can gain a good foothold in the 
renewables sector that allows them to be as dominant in the new energy system as they were in the 
old….’   
Such ‘transition capture’ may figure in German accumulation strategies, but in Canada 
Graham’s research points to ‘a carbon extractive sector without plans for energy transition or 
transition capture’ (2019:25).  Big capital in Canada seems fully committed to the Tar Sands, as 
shown in the massive acquisition of previously foreign-controlled assets in 2017 (Jaremko 2017), 
repeated in May 2018 by the federal government, with its purchase of the full depreciated, existing 
Trans Mountain Pipeline. At the same time, the federal government, aided by aligned civil-society 
groups such as Smart Prosperity, trumpets an energy transition acceptable to fossil capital.  
The Trudeau government’s climate action plan can only be grasped as another instance of 
brokerage politics, melding fossil capitalism with climate capitalism: a robust ‘sell-out’ of bitumen 
(Bush 2018), while global demand still exists, combined with a gentle program of state support for 
renewables and other mitigation efforts. But time is not on this venture’s side, as the costs of 
renewables already undercut carbon.  A recent study (Mercure et al. 2018) charts the likely 
outcome.  As demand for carbon wanes, stranding the fixed capital of high-cost producers, 
Canada’s GDP is projected to plummet (in step with a milder US decline), while Europe and China 
grow as new centres of climate capitalism.     
More generally, however, climate capitalism faces two big challenges: 1/ its pace of change 
is too slow, compared to the realities of the climate emergency and 2/ capital’s growth imperative 
practically precludes a shrinking footprint. Geoengineering, through carbon capture and storage 
 
7  https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter    
8  See (https://www.blackrocksbigproblem.com/.    
13
Socialist Studies / Études socialistes 14 (1) 2020 
 
 
(CCS) or stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI), is in development, but CCS is unproven at utility 
scale and SAI has been deemed potentially dangerous on at global scale. Still, SAI is quickly moving 
from the margins (as a last-resort ‘Plan B’) to the mainstream. Rex Tillerson has described climate 
change as an “engineering problem” with “engineering solutions.”9 As the climate crisis deepens, 
it is increasingly likely that SAI will be applied, at least to buy time for a managed transition in 
which capital’s economic nucleus is fully protected.  The danger is that capital’s rapacious need to 
expand will require increasing doses of SAI as atmospheric carbon concentration climbs toward 
500 ppm – with possibly catastrophic consequences.10  
Climate capitalism fits the Gramscian notion of passive revolution quite well.11 Deployed 
in an organic crisis, when bourgeois hegemony has weakened, passive revolution is ‘a strategy 
which allows the bourgeoisie to reorganize its dominance politically and economically’ (Sassoon 
1982: 134).   Climate capitalism’s system-friendly reforms are a formula for continuity in change, 
managed from above. They appeal to subjectivities already normalized within fossil-fueled 
consumer capitalism. Climate Capitalism’s technocratic approach articulates with a 
‘depoliticization’ tendency in mainstream environmentalism (Swyngedouw 2013). Implicitly, 
Climate Capitalism mobilizes fear, particularly fear of change. As Adam Pzreworski showed in his 
classic rational-choice account of hegemony as class compromise, workers at any given time ‘face 
a choice between climbing upward toward the best situation they could obtain under capitalism 
and a temporary deterioration of their conditions on the road to socialism’ (1985: 177). Moving 
beyond capitalism may be preferable in the long term, but the foreseeable immediate disruptions 
of transformative change are daunting to many.  
Within Climate-Capitalism rhetoric, Justin Trudeau’s mantra, to ‘grow the middle class’, 
invokes the reassuringly familiar desire for more of the same (material goods and services), while 
‘clean growth’ provides the means to that regnant end. Efforts are underway to coopt and develop 
the cadres and organizations needed in constructing a Climate-Capitalism historical bloc – 
whether in state-led climate leadership initiatives or in new state- and industry-supported groups 
in civil society, such as University of Ottawa-based Smart Prosperity (McCartney 2018).  
In the struggle for hegemony, Climate Capitalism  
 
9  Associated Press, “Climate change fears overblown, says ExxonMobil boss,” The Guardian, 28 June 2012, 
www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/jun/28/exxonmobil-climate-change-rex-tillerson 
10  ‘As with all SRM technologies that only address global surface temperatures, dramatic perturbations in the climate 
system can be expected if SAI is deployed. Early research into SAI from the UK’s Met Office Hadley Centre found that 
SAI could lead to severe drought in the Sahel region of Africa. While researchers found that this could possibly be 
countered by injecting particles into the southern hemisphere stratosphere instead, this would likely cause a failure of 
the rains in northeast Brazil.’ http://www.geoengineeringmonitor.org/2018/06/stratospheric_aerosol_injection/ 11 
June 2018 
11  As Surprise (2018: 1230) suggests, SAI is ‘a mechanism that can relieve (for capital) some of the immediate pressures 
of the climate crisis and enable a passive revolution from fossil capitalism to green capitalism, blunting the more radical 
alternatives advanced by the climate justice movement.’ See also Mookerjea (2017). 
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 offers a system-affirming response to the climate crisis which tugs at consumerist hearts 
and technocratic minds, averts the need for any leap into unknown territory, and seems to 
carry minimal costs;   
 promises to reconfigure the forces of production to avert runaway climate change, yet 
protects the relations of production which form the nucleus of a now-global, class-
dominated way of life; and  
 portends a molecular shift in the historical bloc, as fossil capital enters managed decline 
while renewable energy substitutes (and associated workforces) develop under the control 
of big capital.  
Yet even in the short term, success is doubtful. Climate capitalism, particularly through 
geoengineering, may effect a temporal fix to the climate crisis, but looming economic crisis is 
another matter. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial meltdown, only a tiny proportion of 
fictitious capital was written down; hence financial over-accumulation was not significantly 
mitigated. Global crisis management since then has combined renewed austerity with ultra-low 
interest rates, in a pattern of ‘continual postponement, with low profitability, low growth and high 
levels of surplus capital seeking adventurous paths and creating new bubbles’ (Potts 2011: 465).  
MorganChase’s top analyst, Marko Kolanovic, sees the longest bull market in history crashing in 
a financial meltdown within a year or two, ‘likely to result in social tensions similar to those 
witnessed 50 years ago in 1968’ (Son 2018). As in 2008-9, a deep financial crisis layered onto the 
existing civilizational and ecological crisis will reshape the terrain on which the struggle for hearts 
and minds is fought, presenting both left and right with new opportunities and threats.   
As several Gramscian scholars have suggested, to counter a passive revolution one must 
conduct an anti-passive revolution: a war of position which extends popular-democratic and class 
struggles 'so as to mobilize ever-wider sections of the population for democratic reforms' (Simon, 
1982: 49; Buci-Glucksmann, 1979; Sassoon 1982). In that spirit, I want to turn to an alternative, 
currently on the margins of public discourse but not without the prospect of securing practical 
grounding in the emerging era.  
 
 Energy democracy as non-reformist reform 
 
Energy democracy neatly condenses the double power shift, from fossil-fuel power to 
renewables and from corporate oligarchy to democratic control of economic decisions that is so 
urgently needed. A feasible and just alternative to the oligarchic organization of fossil capitalism 
and Climate Capitalism, energy democracy has been endorsed by the international trade union 
movement, including Canada’s largest unions and the Canadian Labour Congress, through Trade 
Unions for Energy Democracy. Energy democracy’s three overarching goals -- ‘resisting the fossil-
fuel-dominant energy agenda while reclaiming and democratically restructuring energy regimes’ 
(Burke and Stephens 2017: 35) – inform a strategy that connects the dots between divestment 
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initiatives, First Nations protectors, anti-fracking protests, community solar projects, etc. (ibid: 
45).  As Sweeney and Treat conclude in their review of this emerging field,  
 
a Just Transition is possible, but it will have to be demanded and driven forward by 
a broad, democratic movement, with unions playing a key role. There will be no 
Just Transition without social and political transformation, and such a 
transformation will be contingent on a successful challenge of existing ownership 
relations and the expansion of economic democracy at all levels. And there will be 
no such transformation until unions and their allies fully grasp the fact that such a 
transformation is both possible and absolutely necessary (2018: 43). 
 
The three projects might be hypothetically charted as in Table 2, with Fossil Capitalism morphing 
in the organic crisis into Climate Capitalism while an incipient bloc organized behind Energy 
Democracy forms as an alternative. 
 
Table 2: Fossil Capitalism Climate Capitalism and Energy Democracy 
 
Fossil Capitalism Climate Capitalism Energy Democracy
organic crisis   passive revolution alternative strategy/project 
 
There is evidence that such a bloc is emerging. Leading NGOs have recently formed an 
international Energy Democracy alliance and have created an open space for participating groups, 
at http://www.energy-democracy.net, where these core principles are presented: 
 Universal access and social justice (ending energy poverty while reducing energy 
consumption and prioritizing needs of communities, households and marginalized 
people); 
 Renewable, sustainable and local energy (shifting to renewables by leaving fossil fuels in 
the ground, divesting from fossil fuels and investing public funds in local renewable energy 
systems to create thriving communities); 
 Public and social ownership (bringing energy production under democratic control, within 
new forms of public ownership by municipalities, citizens’ collectives and workers); 
 Fair play and creation of green jobs (building renewable energy through fairly paid, 
unionized jobs); 
 Democratic control and participation (empowering citizens and workers to participate in 
energy policy by democratizing governance and instituting complete transparency). 
We can recognize in this framing a project that is both ethico-political and economic/ecological, 
that addresses both forces and relations of production, and that resonates with the concerns of 
several intersecting movements. 
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As Hall (1988) observed, the struggle for an alternative hegemony occurs on terrain already 
shaped by the existing hegemony. In this light we can revisit some of the key instances in fossil-
capital hegemony, with an eye toward the forms that energy democracy might take at different 
scales.   
 
Table 3: Practices of Fossil Capitalism and Energy Democracy at Different Scales 
 
Scale Instances of fossil-capital hegemony Practices of energy democracy 
Everyday life Fossil-fueled consumer capitalism as a 
way of life, automobility as freedom 
Politically-inflected lifestyle 





Indigenous ambivalence  
Free public transit, principled 
alliance politics of decolonization 
and democratization, subsidiarity 
Institutions Entrenchment of fossil interests in 
institutions of knowledge production, 
etc. 
Reclaiming public institutions, 
divestment, science and technology 
for the people 
Sub-national Fossil boosterism in extractive and 
sacrifice zones 
Reclaim Alberta, Iron and Earth  
National Contention over the ‘national 
interest’, through elite policy-planning 
and online extractivist populist 
networks 
Leap, RAVEN (Respecting 
Aboriginal Values and 
Environmental Needs), Green New 
Deal 
Transnational Global governance and transnational 
policy-planning 




  In everyday life, politically-inflected lifestyle changes and informal networks that reject 
fossil-fueled consumerism can foster changes in ‘common sense’ that pull people away from the 
doxa of fossil-fueled consumerism and enlarge the popular base for energy democracy. Within 
local communities, decarbonization and decommodification of public transit can have a broader 
impact, as can practices such as community gardening that open alternatives to carboniferous 
industrial agriculture. Indigenous resistance to colonization, closely associated with Indigenous 
resurgence (Coburn and Atleo 2016), propels Aboriginal communities into positions of leadership, 
in alliance with environmental and other movements, in a principled politics of decolonization 
and democratization that reaches beyond local communities. Corporatized institutions such as 
universities can be reclaimed as public services, as can science and technology.  At sub-national 
scale, grassroots groups like Reclaim Alberta are calling for a just transition that heals the Earth 
from fossil capital’s notorious externalities, while Iron and Earth, led by tar sands workers, has 
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created ‘a platform to engage in renewable energy development issues, and to empower us to 
advocate for an energy future we can be proud of creating.’12 Across Canada, Leap, both the 
Manifesto and the movement it has spawned, is a significant intervention in re-defining the 
national interest, which explicitly uses an energy democracy frame. RAVEN, an Indigenous-led 
initiative, provides material support in legal struggles over the integrity of traditional lands and 
cultures.13 As I write this essay, an important initiative has been taking shape, involving 
community-based discussions that feed into a bottom-up process to define ‘what a Green New 
Deal should look like, to identify commonalities, and to start developing specific proposals.’14 
These struggles contest the notion of a ‘“national interest” that prioritizes short-term economic 
gain from finite and polluting resources’ (Berman 2018). Transnationally, hegemonic global 
governance is countered by networks from below that include the Indigenous Environmental 
Network and Trade Unions for Energy Democracy.15 Such formations are crucial since, in view of 
its scale and scope, fossil capitalism’s organic crisis ‘cannot be sensibly addressed without global 
vision and strategy’ (Carroll 2016: 207).   
The challenge is to articulate these progressive forces into a coherent bloc that includes 
energy-sector workers, for whom a just transition must foster ‘upward-leveling relationships’ so 
that as fossil energy is decommissioned displaced workers find comparable positions in a rapidly 
expanding renewable energy sector (Abramsky 2010: 657). Such formation requires dialogical 
engagement through communicative democracy, to undo the exclusionary practices that relegate 
some voices to the margins and that replicate, within the left, the logic of hierarchy (Carroll 2015: 
666). Yet to encompass a deep transformation the bloc must extend beyond energy democracy per 
se. In view of the foundational relationship in Canada between colonialism and capitalism, 
decarbonization and democratization must be conjoined with decolonization, enhancing 
capacities for Indigenous self-determination. By the same token, the close symbiosis between 
energy and finance means that a robust energy democracy must bring the financial sector itself 
under democratic control. Much the same can be said about the need to undo hegemonic corporate 
power within communications media, to ‘remake media’ by democratizing public communication 
(Hackett and Carroll 2006).   
For André Gorz (1967), non-reformist reforms are steps toward system change, which 
avoid co-optation by disturbing the capitalist status quo in ways that build popular power.  Energy 
democracy is in this sense a bundle of targeted, non-reformist reforms, an ‘entry project’ (Brie 
2010) that can open space for democratization and decolonization of economic, political and 
cultural life. In such a transformation, corporate power would give way to popular power and 
participatory planning in production and allocation, to environmental stewardship and authentic 
reconciliation, to a revitalized public sphere and inclusive community development. To address 
 
12  See http://www.reclaimalberta.ca/, http://www.ironandearth.org/about_us. 
13  See https://leapmanifesto.org/en/the-leap-manifesto/, https://raventrust.com/. 
14  See See https://act.greennewdealcanada.ca/what-we-heard/, where themes from over 150 town hall meetings held 
across Canada in the spring of 2019 are summarized. 
15  See http://www.ienearth.org/, http://unionsforenergydemocracy.org/.     
18




the modalities of corporate power that sustain capitalist hegemony, energy democracy needs to 
develop in concert with other non-reformist reforms in the workplace, in finance and in cultural 
production, in a war of position that adds up to a project of democratic eco-socialism (cf. Baer 
2019; Candieas 2013; Löwy 2018; Satgar 2018), incorporating, within an expansive historical bloc, 
those struggling for economic, climate and gender justice and against racism and ongoing 
colonization. 
The case of Canada is helpful in illuminating substantive and strategic issues that resonate 
more widely throughout the Global North and, arguably, the world. The urgent struggle for a world 
beyond fossil capital may be the leading edge of convergent movements to create a socially just and 
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